Nezhyva Mariia and Mysiuk Viktoriia, (2022)

The aim of the article is to study the impact of the war in Ukraine on inflation risks and challenges for the world economy. At the same time, the paper wants to emphasise that it is expected that the war in Ukraine will have a significant impact on the economy and consumers in terms of such actions: expanding the supply chain, increasing inflationary pressures, deteriorating economic prospects. 

https://www.academia.edu/85437786/War_in_Ukraine_challenges_for_the_global_economy 

Knott, Eleanor (2022)

‘If Russia stops fighting, there will be no war. If Ukraine stops fighting, there will be no Ukraine’ is the sentiment used by Ukrainian protesters mobilising against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Such a sentiment signifies the stakes of a war where Ukraine is a democratic nation-state fighting for its right to exist against a Russian invasion. Meanwhile, Russia is fighting for a version of Ukraine that is subservient to Russia’s idea of what Ukraine should be as a nation-state: under a Russian hegemon geopolitically, where Ukraine’s national idea and interpretation of history can be vetted and vetoed by the Russian state. While nationalism scholarship equips us to study Russia’s war against Ukraine through the lens of Russian ethnic nationalism and Ukrainian civic nationalism, the ethnic/civic dichotomy falls short of unpacking the more pernicious logics that pervade Russia’s intentions and actions towards Ukraine (demilitarisation and de-Nazification). Instead, this article explores the logics of Russia’s war and Ukraine’s resistance through the concept of existential nationalism where existential nationalism is Russia’s motivation to pursue war, whatever the costs, and Ukraine’s motivation to fight with everything it has.

https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12878 

Layton, Peter, (2022)

“Russia’s war has stalled. There are small advances, but at high cost. Russian forces started the war with simultaneous attacks across Ukraine. They have not been able to do such advances for almost two weeks now. The Ukrainian armed forces are taking advantage of this and inflicting a grinding rate of attrition.”

https://www.academia.edu/74267567/Scenarios_for_the_war_in_Ukraine

Katarzyna Karakiewicz-Krawczyk, et. all. (2022)

“The aim of the research was to collect Poles’ opinions about the need to provide humanitarian aid to Ukrainians from the territories of the Russian–Ukrainian war. Capturing feelings of Poles towards Ukrainians during the war is an interesting issue that shows subjective opinions about the existential situation perceived in the space of mutual personal interactions. The results showing opinions on help were collected from a group of 1012 people throughout Poland with the help of an authorial questionnaire. The obtained data shows a positive attitude of Poles to Ukrainians.”

https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph192013369

Antezza, A. et. all. (2023)

“This paper presents the “Ukraine Support Tracker”, which lists and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. This sixth version covers government commitments made between January 24 and August 3, 2022 and has a new detailed overview on weapon deliveries. We track support by 40 governments, including all G7 and European Union member countries, plus by EU institutions (thus including 41 donors). Private donations and aid through non-governmental organisations are not included due to a lack of systematic data, but we do show estimates on government costs of hosting Ukrainian refugees. To value in-kind support like military equipment or foodstuff, we rely on government statements as well as our own calculations using market prices. We find significant differences in the scale of support across countries, both in absolute terms and as percent of donor country GDP. In billions of Euros, by far the largest bilateral supporter of Ukraine is the United States, followed by the EU institutions and the United Kingdom. In percent of donor GDP, Eastern European countries stand out as particularly generous, and this is even more so once we account for refugee costs. In the past months (June and July), new commitments have fallen notably, thus further widening the gap between what Ukraine demands and the foreign aid it receives.”

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/262746/1/KWP2218v5.pdf

Radomyski, Adam (2021)

“The paper presents the results of research, whose main goal is to evaluate the aviation and rocket capability of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and Ukraine in terms of a possible launch of regular warfare. The authors primarily focus on changes in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, which have created legal determinants of the use of armed forces outside the country’s territory in defence of national minorities, illustrated by taking control of Crimea. The authors also stress Russia’s military plans, including the development directions of the potential of armed forces as well as a possible threat to the security of the eastern NATO’s flank in the event of a conflict in Ukraine. In this respect, the capabilities of the air defence of countries on the eastern NATO flank, particularly Poland’s capability, were analysed.”

https://doi.org/10.12775/HiP.2021.035

Katchanovski, Ivan (2022)

“This study examines the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 and the origins of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the political transition during the Maidan in Ukraine in 2014. This transition of power contributed to the civil war in Donbas, Russian military interventions in Crimea and Donbas, the Russian annexation of Crimea and an international conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the West and Russia. This conflict escalated when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. The research question is as follows: What is the nature of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political transition in Ukraine during the Maidan? This issue produced divergent narratives of this war and the Maidan in scholarly studies, the media, and governments. This paper uses political science theories of wars, mass protests, coups, revolutions, and regime changes and empirical analysis of various evidence to examine the nature of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political transition during the Maidan.”

https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2022-4bn8w

Zabrodskyi, Mykhaylo et. all. (2022), Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

Assessment of the Ukrainian Armys and Russians Army strengths, vulnerability and capability. This is based on the periode February 2022 to July 2022. Results are important for NATO partners and can help to discuss support opportunities for Ukraine. Take away, 1. Consumption rates are high and critical for high-intensity wars. 2. The Ukrainian Army could resist due to its adaptability and innovation rather than superior equipment. 3. The use of old weapon systems has to be rethought and combined with the impact of new systems. Old systems are not obsolete and the war in Ukraine shows that they are still capable. “For Ukraine, victory is essential but can only be achieved with the ongoing support of its international partners.“ 

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022 (21.02.2023)