Howorth, Jolyon (2022)

Jolyon discusses the weaknesses of the European Union as shown by the war against Ukraine. A lack of strength and unity towards Russia and the EU being not a military or security actor is noticed by Russia and the US.

“The crisis in Ukraine has highlighted the weaknesses of the EU as an international actor. Although the EU is an economic, commercial and regulatory giant, it has not succeeded in emerging as a significant military or security actor—despite having announced a ‘common foreign and security policy’ 30 years ago. In particular, it is deeply divided over policy towards Russia. Moreover, attempts to devise an overall policy for its neighbourhood, and in particular an ‘Eastern Partnership’ focused on the borderline states between the Union and Russia, have been widely judged as failures. In the showdown between Russia and the West over Ukraine, the EU per se has been marginalised by both Moscow and Washington. Various EU member states have embraced different preferences with respect to the potential resolution of the Ukraine crisis. In the context of potential discussions, demanded by Vladimir Putin, on a ‘new security order’ for Eurasia, the EU’s absence is tragic.”

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/17816858221089371 (21.02.2023).

Layton, Peter, (2022)

“Russia’s war has stalled. There are small advances, but at high cost. Russian forces started the war with simultaneous attacks across Ukraine. They have not been able to do such advances for almost two weeks now. The Ukrainian armed forces are taking advantage of this and inflicting a grinding rate of attrition.”

https://www.academia.edu/74267567/Scenarios_for_the_war_in_Ukraine

Antezza, A. et. all. (2023)

“This paper presents the “Ukraine Support Tracker”, which lists and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. This sixth version covers government commitments made between January 24 and August 3, 2022 and has a new detailed overview on weapon deliveries. We track support by 40 governments, including all G7 and European Union member countries, plus by EU institutions (thus including 41 donors). Private donations and aid through non-governmental organisations are not included due to a lack of systematic data, but we do show estimates on government costs of hosting Ukrainian refugees. To value in-kind support like military equipment or foodstuff, we rely on government statements as well as our own calculations using market prices. We find significant differences in the scale of support across countries, both in absolute terms and as percent of donor country GDP. In billions of Euros, by far the largest bilateral supporter of Ukraine is the United States, followed by the EU institutions and the United Kingdom. In percent of donor GDP, Eastern European countries stand out as particularly generous, and this is even more so once we account for refugee costs. In the past months (June and July), new commitments have fallen notably, thus further widening the gap between what Ukraine demands and the foreign aid it receives.”

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/262746/1/KWP2218v5.pdf

Radomyski, Adam (2021)

“The paper presents the results of research, whose main goal is to evaluate the aviation and rocket capability of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and Ukraine in terms of a possible launch of regular warfare. The authors primarily focus on changes in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, which have created legal determinants of the use of armed forces outside the country’s territory in defence of national minorities, illustrated by taking control of Crimea. The authors also stress Russia’s military plans, including the development directions of the potential of armed forces as well as a possible threat to the security of the eastern NATO’s flank in the event of a conflict in Ukraine. In this respect, the capabilities of the air defence of countries on the eastern NATO flank, particularly Poland’s capability, were analysed.”

https://doi.org/10.12775/HiP.2021.035

Zabrodskyi, Mykhaylo et. all. (2022), Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

Assessment of the Ukrainian Armys and Russians Army strengths, vulnerability and capability. This is based on the periode February 2022 to July 2022. Results are important for NATO partners and can help to discuss support opportunities for Ukraine. Take away, 1. Consumption rates are high and critical for high-intensity wars. 2. The Ukrainian Army could resist due to its adaptability and innovation rather than superior equipment. 3. The use of old weapon systems has to be rethought and combined with the impact of new systems. Old systems are not obsolete and the war in Ukraine shows that they are still capable. “For Ukraine, victory is essential but can only be achieved with the ongoing support of its international partners.“ 

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022 (21.02.2023)